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Abstract: This paper empirically examines whether expansion of the EU has increased 
international tax competition. To do so, we use a market potential weighting scheme to 
estimate the slope of best responses. We find robust evidence for tax competition. In 
particular, our estimates suggest that EU membership affects responses with EU members 
responding more to the tax rates of other members. This lends credence to the above-
noted concerns. 
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1. Introduction 
  There is no doubt that one of the foremost policy issues surrounding public 
finance in the European Union (EU) – and the world beyond – is the issue of tax 
competition. There have been long-standing concerns that as nations compete for mobile 
investment that this has resulted in a race to the bottom in taxes, resulting in 
underprovision of public goods as well as potential distortions in firm decisions. As 
illustrated in Figure 1, which shows average tax rates across a number of developed 
countries, there is a clear downward trend in taxes, potentially indicative of such a race to 
the bottom. IMF Deputy Director Murilo Portugal (2007) verbalizes these fears stating 
“there is equally little doubt that globalization is likely to have a substantial effect on 
countries' ability to sustain tax revenues”. These concerns have grown alongside the 
expansion of the EU, with the belief that falling trade barriers between members may 
have led to an intensification of tax competition. This view has been vigorously 
championed by current French president Nicolas Sarkozy who has repeatedly blasted the 
new accession countries for cutting their tax rates shortly after joining the EU and 
threatened their EU aid payments saying that “nations can’t claim to be rich enough to do 
away with taxes while also claiming to be poor enough to ask other nations to provide 
funds for them” (Crumley, 2004).  
The goal of this paper is to empirically investigate whether tax competition has 
intensified as a result of EU expansion. In doing so, we utilize the model of Baldwin and 
Krugman (2004) which indicates that the importance attached to a nation’s tax rate 
depends on its market potential (which includes the domestic market and exports). This 
builds from the growing trade literature incorporating the importance of geography and 2 
 
third country effects into trade models.
1 In addition, we examine the extent to which 
countries respond to one another differently depending on EU membership. Our estimates 
provide robust evidence of tax competition consistent with the race to the bottom. 
Furthermore, we find that the extent of competition depends on EU membership, with EU 
members responding more competitively to tax cuts by EU members than by non-
members. This then provides support for the above-noted fears since our estimates 
suggest that if the new accession countries had lowered their taxes but remained outside 
the EU, that EU member tax rates would have been 1.85%, or just over one percentage 
point, higher. 
Despite the large theoretic literature on international tax competition and an 
equally voluminous public debate on the topic, the empirical evidence on the 
international interdependence of taxes is remarkably limited.
2 To fill this void, 
researchers have begun to employ spatial econometric methods to gain insight into how 
the tax set in one country affects that set in another. This method involves using an 
instrumented value for the weighted average of other nations’ taxes as an explanatory 
variable for a given country tax. The weighting scheme is an assumption that implies that 
some external tax rates matter more than others. For example, weighting by distance 
supposes that proximate countries’ taxes matter more than distant ones because of the 
ease of investment relocating from country i to country j for tax purposes to export back 
to country i. Another alternative is weighting by GDP, which is intuitive when FDI is 
                                                 
1 Examples of this literature include Anderson and van Wincoop (2003), Feenstra (2004), and Ekholm, 
Forslid and Markusen (2007) among many others. 
2 Wilson (1999), Gresik (2001), and Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2005) survey the theory literature on tax 
competition as well as the empirical work on how firms respond to taxation. Note that this latter issue is 
quite distinct from evidence of tax competition as it shows how agents respond to taxes, not how taxes in 
one country depend on those set in another. 3 
 
attracted to larger domestic markets, meaning that investment is more willing to relocate 
from i to j than to k when j is larger than k.  As such the taxes of large countries matter 
more to country i when choosing its tax than those of small ones.  
Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) utilize data on OECD countries and 
find that, depending on the weights, they obtain a significant spatial lag (the term used for 
the coefficient on the other nations’ taxes). In particular, when weighting by GDP, they 
find a positive spatial lag, i.e. higher taxes elsewhere imply a higher tax in a given 
country. In game theoretic terms, this is equivalent to evidence of strategic 
complementarity, a key requirement for the oft-discussed race to the bottom. Other 
weighting schemes provide less robust results. Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007) weight 
by distance and find some evidence that two year changes in a country’s tax rate are 
positively correlated with the comparable change in other nations’ taxes. Overesch and 
Rinke (2008) and Klemm and van Parys (2009) also weight by distance and find similar 
results for the level of taxes for European and developing countries respectively. 
Similarly, Crabbe and Vandenbussche (2008) examine the taxes of the EU15 countries as 
they depend on the taxes of the new accession countries, finding a positive correlation for 
nations adjacent to the new accession countries.
3 Redoano (2007) uses both distance and 
GDP weights, finding positive lags for each.
4 Using a sample of OECD countries, 
                                                 
3 It is important to note that their investigation differs from ours in two critical ways. First, they only 
consider the EU members; we consider a broader selection of nations. Second, they only allow the new 
member taxes to affect the taxes of the EU15. Thus, they do not consider whether EU15 taxes depend on 
other EU15 taxes, nor whether new member taxes depend on EU15 taxes. This is therefore a very different 
approach to the issue than the one we take here. One notable contribution of their work, however, is that 
they estimate a response specifically for the new accession countries.  
4 Redoano (2007) also includes a weighting scheme in which only EU members are given positive weights. 
When doing so, however, she assumes that both EU members and non-members respond identically to 
these nations and that no countries respond to non-members. We relax both of these assumptions and find 
that the latter is soundly rejected by the data. Redoano (2010)  follows our method of separate distance-
weighted spatial lags for EU and non-EU nations, applying it to a sample of European countries from 1970-4 
 
Exbrayat (2009) finds no significant spatial lags when weighting by GDP or distance, but 
does when weighting by a bilateral trade integration measure. Finally, several studies, 
including Garretsen and Peeters (2007), Dreher (2006), and Haufler, Klemm, and 
Schjelderup (2006), utilize equal weights (i.e. the simple average of other nations’ taxes) 
with mixed results. 
Although the above weighting schemes are intuitive as it is natural to expect that 
countries pay more attention to large players or to neighbors, they miss a critical aspect of 
FDI: access to third markets. In the trade literature, an increasing number of papers 
illustrate the importance of a country’s economic geography in its attractiveness to FDI. 
As discussed theoretically by Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007), so called export 
platform FDI from country i will be attracted to country j even if j is small when j has 
export access to an important third country k. Empirical work supporting the existence of 
export platform FDI is provided by Head and Mayer (2004), Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, 
Naughton (2007), and Baltagi, Egger, and Pfaffermayer (2007). Export platform issues 
are likely to be a particularly important aspect of FDI in a free trade area such as the EU, 
something confirmed in the estimates of Blonigen, et. al (2007). Baldwin and Krugman 
(2004) develop a model that brings this notion to the tax competition literature. Using an 
economic geography model that illustrates the importance of market potential – that is 
access not only to the local market but also all of the foreign ones – for FDI, they show 
that because export platform FDI is more attracted to nations with larger market 
potentials such countries will have higher Nash tax rates. An additional implication is 
                                                                                                                                            
1999, finding results similar to our Europe-only regressions. These results are broadly similar to those 
reported here. 5 
 
that, because multinationals are more responsive to high market potential countries’ 
taxes, so too are other nations competing for those firms.  
Note that while GDP is certainly correlated with the size of the domestic market 
and net exports, it under-weights small countries that import a great deal from other 
countries. As shown in Figure 2, in our data the percentage difference between GDP and 
market potential is indeed greatest for small countries, which are also those that tend to 
have lower tax rates. Thus a GDP weighting scheme under-represents the countries with 
the lowest taxes. Similarly, distance is correlated with trade between two countries but, as 
a wealth of trade regressions indicate, it only explains a portion of trade levels. 
Furthermore, using distance between, say, Ireland and the UK when determining the UK 
tax rate ignores the ability of Ireland to export to other nations. A comparable problem 
exists for the trade integration weighting of Exbrayat (2009). As discussed in papers such 
as Head and Mayer (2004) and Blonigen, et. al (2007, 2008), failure to account for 
proximity to other markets gives a poor measure of market potential, indicating the 
weakness of this weight. Anselin (1988) highlights the importance of the weighting 
scheme, cautioning that improper specification can yield misleading and spurious results. 
In addition to ignoring third countries, using a weight such as GDP is problematic 
because if FDI affects GDP and taxes affect FDI, then the weight itself is endogenous to 
the tax rate. As such, as discussed below, the constructed instrument does not resolve the 
endogeneity problem spatial econometrics is intended to solve. The measure of market 
potential we utilize avoids both of these pitfalls. 
An additional contribution of this paper is to relax the standard assumption that all 
countries respond in identical fashions to others’ taxes. In the current context, the existing 6 
 
literature imposes the restriction that a country responds equally to EU and non-EU 
countries’ taxes. Further, the typical approach assumes that EU and non-EU countries 
respond identically to others taxes. With the above noted policy maker concerns in mind, 
we relax these assumptions. Our analysis rejects both of these restrictions. In particular, 
we find robust evidence that all countries respond more to EU taxes than to non-EU taxes 
with this difference being greatest for EU members. This does indeed suggest that as the 
EU expands, it forces existing members to respond more to the low taxes of new 
members than they did previously. 
  In the next section, we describe our empirical approach and our data. Results are 
contained in Section 3. Section 4 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical Specification and Data 
  In this section, we outline our empirical approach and describe our data.  
 2.1 Empirical Specification 
We begin with the “workhorse” regression specification adopted by Devereux, 
Lockwood, Redoano (2008), Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007), and Overesch and Rincke 
(2008). This baseline specification takes the form:  
  , , , , , l t l t lk t k t l t
k l
t X t β ρ ω ε
≠
= + + ∑   (1) 
where  , l t t  is the tax rate in country l in year t,  , l t X  is a vector of control variables 
specific to country l,  , , lk t k t
k l
t ω
≠ ∑  is the spatial lag which is a weighted-sum of other 
countries' tax rates, and  , l t ε  is an i.i.d. error term. We modify this by allowing for two 
spatial lags, one for non-EU countries and one for EU countries: 7 
 
  , , , , , , ,
, ,
non EU EU
l t l t lk t k t lk t k t l t
k l k EU k l k EU
t X t t β ρ ω ρ ω ε
−
≠ ∉ ≠ ∈
= + + + ∑ ∑   (2) 
where the first weighted sum is just across non-EU members and the second is just across 
EU members.
5 This specification will permit us to test whether nations respond 
differently to EU and non-EU members. In addition to exploring whether countries 
respond differently to EU and non-EU countries, doing so provides an additional 
econometric benefit. As discussed in detail by Overesch and Rincke (2008), as the 
number of countries in the sample grows, the weight given to any given country becomes 
small, leading the spatial lag to become roughly constant across countries. Separating the 
countries into groups as we do reduces this problem since it increases the magnitude of 
the weight assigned to each individual country.
6  
Since taxes are interdependent, the spatial lags are endogenous and are 
instrumented for using the weighted sum of other nations’ exogenous variables, i.e. by 
estimating: 
  , , , , , lk t k t lk t l t l t
k l k l
t X ω β ω ε
≠ ≠
= + ∑ ∑ ￿ ￿ .  (3) 
This is done separately for the EU and non-EU countries. In these weighted sums,  , lk t ω  is 
the weight that the tax rate in country k  gets in country l's observation for year t.
7 As is 
common, we row-standardize so that the weights sum to one in each category for each 
observation.
8 For our weights, we use Market Potentialk,t which equals the sum of k’s 
                                                 
5 Redoano (2007) also considers estimates with an EU-only spatial lag. However, in doing so she does not 
include a non-EU spatial lag, implicitly assuming that countries do not respond to non-EU nations. 
6 When we separate our countries, the smallest non-EU weight is .03 and the smallest EU weight is .025. 
Alternatively, one might suppose that the least important countries should receive zero weights. With this 
in mind, in unreported results, we reset the weights of countries with calculated weights less than or equal 
to .03 to zero. This did not change the qualitative nature of the results. 
7 It should be noted that Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007) use the t-1 value of k’s tax in some regressions 
and that Overesch and Rincke (2008) use this in all their specifications.  
8 See Anselin (1988) on details of row standardization.  8 
 
GDP and imports in year t. Our rationale for this follows the model of Baldwin and 
Krugman (2004) who consider tax competition in an economic geography setting (a 
simplified version of which is presented in the appendix). Their model indicates that 
larger countries have an advantage in attracting investment since a firm will prefer to 
supply this large market locally thereby avoiding trade costs. In addition, the model 
shows that countries with low transport costs to the rest of the world are also attractive to 
investment since a firm’s profits depends on its ability to access the global market as well 
as the local one. This idea is particularly important for the issue of taxation in the EU 
where (often low tax) periphery nations are able compete for investment on the basis of 
their easy access to other EU members.  Both of these factors increase the elasticity of 
investment to the tax rate of such large, well-situated economies. In turn, this increases 
the slope of the best response of other nations to such economies’ tax rates. Our measure 
of market potential, the sum of domestic consumption plus gross exports, thus mirrors the 
results of Baldwin and Krugman (2004).
9 
 If tax competition takes place for mobile, exporting firms, it must be recognized 
that market potential is potentially endogenous. This is particularly troublesome for small 
periphery countries such as Ireland for whom export platform FDI comprises a significant 
share of the economy. We therefore construct exogenous proxies for the weights in order 
to estimate (3), otherwise the right-hand side control variables will not be exogenous to 




, 0 1 , 2 3 , 4 , i t i t i t i t t i i t MarketPotential Population Population EU Trend η η η η η η ε = + + + + + + (4) 
                                                 
9 Contrast this to GDP which is the sum of domestic consumption and net exports. It is worth noting that 
GDP weights are lower for countries that import a lot relative to the size of their economies, countries that 
in our sample also tend to be low tax ones. Bilateral distance between countries, another common weight, is 
also potentially misleading because it ignores both the size of the local market and access to third countries. 9 
 
i.e. Market Potentiali,t, as a function of population and its square, EU membership, a time 
trend, and country specific fixed effects.
10 The use of fixed effects controls for proximity 
to other markets.
11 The results from this regression which has an R2 of 0.72 are found in 
the Appendix. This regression was then used to construct a proxy is used for the weights 
for spatial lag term.  
  Finally, we will allow the slope of the best response for country l with regards to 
country k’s tax to depend not only on whether k is an EU member or not, but also on 
whether l is. This specification is given by: 
 
, , , , , , ,
, ,
, , , , , ,
, ,
non EU non EU
l t l t lk t k t l t lk t k t
k l k EU k l k EU
EU EU
lk t k t l t lk t k t l t
k l k EU k l k EU
t X t EU t
t EU t
β ρ ω ρ ω
ρ ω ρ ω ε
− −
≠ ∉ ≠ ∉





  (5) 
which adds an interaction term between  , l t EU , a dummy variable equal to 1 when l is an 
EU member in year t, and the two spatial lags to the specification of (2). 
2.2 Data 
  Our data is an unbalanced panel of countries spanning 1980-2005. The list of 
countries and years they first appear in our sample is found in Table 1.
12 Note that since 
some of the countries do not enter until the second half of our sample (particularly the 
eastern European ones), one of our robustness checks will be to re-estimate the model 
using just the years 1995-2005 so that we have a balanced panel. All non-binary variables 
are measured in logs.
13 
  For the majority of the presented results, we use the effective average tax rate 
(EATR). As argued in Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003), if the firm is making an 
                                                 
10 Here, the EU dummy is intended to help control for the lower trade costs EU members may enjoy. 
11 As found by Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, and Naughton (2007), this is typically sufficient to control for 
this factor when predicting FDI activity. 
12 The sample of countries is determined by the availability of tax rate data. 
13 This includes the variables used to estimate (4). 10 
 
extensive location decision, the EATR is the relevant measure of taxation. We utilize 
their approach along with the data of Loretz (2008) to calculate our EATR measure. The 
appendix gives additional detail on the construction of the EATR. In addition to this tax 
measure, in robustness checks we instead use the statutory rate. 
  Seven variables comprise the vector of exogenous explanatory variables  , l t X . For 
our measure of a nation’s market potential, Market Potentiall,t, we use the constructed 
version discussed above, which is measured in millions of constant US dollars (base year 
2000). In line with Baldwin and Krugman, as well as other studies that find a positive 
coefficient on GDP in tax regressions, we anticipate a positive coefficient. In addition we 
include Gov. Expendituresl,t-1 which is government expenditures as a share of GDP. Note 
that we are assuming that although GDP and government expenditures might vary with 
the tax rate, the ratio of the two does not. As additional insurance against endogeneity, we 
use the lagged value of this variable.
14 Consistent with the expectation that governments 
with large expenditure requirements will have less ability to lower taxes to compete for 
investment, we anticipate a positive coefficient. We also include two demographic 
variables. Urbanl,t is the percentage of the population living in urban areas. Dependencyl,t, 
is the ratio of the dependents to the working age population. Given the results of 
Devereux, et al. (2008), we anticipate a negative coefficient for the dependency ratio. All 
of the above mentioned variables were obtained from the 2008 World Development 
Indicators.
15 
  In addition to these, we constructed Opennessl,t, which is the ratio of exports to 
market potential and is intended to mirror a similar variable used in other papers. Here, 
                                                 
14 In unreported results, we used the contemporaneous value of government expenditures, with little change 
in our results. 
15 The World Bank Data can be found at http://www.worldbank.org/data 11 
 
not only must we deal with the endogeneity of market potential, but also exports. Thus, to 






, , 0 , 1 , 2 3 ,
2
4 5 , , 6 ,
l t
j t
l j t l j l t j t
l j t t l t
Exports Population Population Population
Population Regional Trend
κ κ κ κ κ
κ κ η ε
= + + + +
+ + + +
  (6) 
where  , l j κ  is a direction-pair specific fixed effect and Regionall,j,t is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when the countries are both members of a regional trade agreement.
17 This 
latter variable was obtained from Rose (2005). Export data come from the IMF’s 
Direction of Trade Statistics and population data again come from the World Bank. Full 
details of this regression can be found in the appendix.  
We include a dummy variable  , l t EU  for EU membership. Since EU membership 
grows over time, our robustness checks include a set of regressions where rather than 
utilizing EU membership, we use a dummy variable equal to one only for the EU15 
countries, a categorization which includes the major members of the EU but does not 
vary in size over time. Table 1 indicates the countries that fall into this category. Finally 
we include a time trend and, in most specifications, country-specific fixed effects. Fixed 
effects are useful in filtering out the impact of country specific but time invariant factors 
such as geography, placement in physical space on the globe, national attitudes towards 
taxation, and the like. 
Summary statistics for our variables are found in Table 2. As a final note, due to 
the construction of explanatory variables, we bootstrap our error terms fifty times in all 
regressions. 
                                                 
16 For details on gravity models, which are the standard for estimating trade levels, see Rose (2005). Note 
that, again due to concerns over the endogeneity of GDP, we utilize population rather than GDP to estimate 
exports. 
17 Note that this fixed effect controls for common trade predictors such as distance, island/landlocked 
status, shared colonial history, and common language. 12 
 
3. Results 
 3.1 Baseline Results 
Table 3 presents our baseline results. Column 1 utilizes our set of control 
variables without any spatial lag. This is in order to compare our results to those typically 
found in the literature. We find that, as expected, countries with larger market potentials 
have higher taxes. This would be consistent with the notion that these countries have 
advantages that allow them to set higher taxes without deterring firms from locating 
there. Consistent with other studies, we also find that countries with high government 
expenditures relative to GDP, urban populations, and low dependency ratios all have 
higher taxes. In addition, we find that EU members tend to have lower taxes. Although it 
is not always significant, similar to other studies we find more open countries have higher 
taxes. Finally, our trend term highlights the oft-discussed downward trend in taxes. 
Comparing these estimates across specifications in this and subsequent tables shows that 
the findings for our control variables are generally consistent across specifications.  
  Column 2 introduces our two spatial lags, one for EU members and one for non-
members, each of which is the constructed market potential weighted sum of the relevant 
set of taxes. As column 2 reports, both spatial lags are significantly positive. To correctly 
interpret the estimated coefficients, it is important to recognize what they capture. The 
regression estimates the correlation between the tax rate of country l and the weighted 
tax rate of country k . The size of the marginal effect of k ’s tax is the product of the 
estimated coefficient and its weight (k’s share of its group’s total market potential). The 
average over the sample for total EU market potential is 161.1, roughly half that of total 13 
 
non-EU market potential of 266.1.
18  Thus, moving country k from a non-EU country to 
an EU country increases its weight by 1.65 (i.e. 266.1/161.1). Therefore, even if the 
estimated coefficients were the same across the two groups of countries, since EU 
countries have greater  , lk t ω s the slope of the best response is larger for EU than non-EU 
countries. Put differently: EU and non-EU countries would have a similar impact if 
1.65ρ
EU= ρ
non-EU. This hypothesis is rejected with a p-value of less than 0.1 percent. 
  These results indicate that tax rates are strategic complements – i.e. as other 
countries lower their EATRs the country in question lowers its own as well. In addition, 
given the discussion above, nations respond more fiercely to tax changes by EU members 
than non-members all else equal. Finally, note that in this and subsequent regressions, we 
fail to reject the hypothesis that the coefficient on the EU spatial lag is less than one. 
Thus, we cannot reject the null that an increase in all EU taxes of 1% leads to a less than 
1% change in this country’s tax, suggestive of a stable Nash equilibrium. 
In column 3, we examine not only whether a given country responds differently to 
EU and non-EU taxes, but also on whether its response to a given set of countries 
depends on whether it is itself an EU member. One reason is that trade between EU 
members may be particularly streamlined relative to trade between a member and a non-
member or between non-members. This could impact the tax sensitivity of investment 
leading to a difference between and EU member response to a given tax rate and the 
response of a non-member. Another is that since many economic policies (such as trade 
and immigration) are coordinated among EU members, EU members may respond 
differently than non-members when setting unilateral policies such as corporate tax rates. 
                                                 
18 The market potential of a country is measured in log billions of constant 2000 US dollars as are these 
totals. 14 
 
To this end, we now interact our two spatial lag terms with the EU membership dummy 
variable as per (5).  
For the non-interacted spatial lags, we find results similar to those in column 2, 
namely that taxes are strategic complements. However, not all countries respond in the 
same way. As before, the coefficients on Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t and EU Spatial Lagl,t 
imply that non-EU countries respond more to EU members, however the difference in 
these magnitudes is smaller with a mere 34 percent difference (as compared to the 60 
percent difference in column 2). This difference, however, is significantly larger for EU 
members since their response to non-member taxes is only half as large with a point 
estimate of .328 (i.e. the sum of EUl,t * non-EU Spatial Lagl,t, and non-EU Spatial Lagl,t). 
Furthermore, given the point estimate on EUl,t * EU Spatial Lagl,t, EU members respond 
more to EU taxes than non-members do (although the coefficient is not statistically 
significant). As shown in column 4, this result is robust to the inclusion of country-
specific fixed effects. Therefore, given the less stringent assumptions of the fixed effects 
approach, we will utilize it as our preferred specification in subsequent regressions. 
These estimates give credence to the concern that as countries switch into the EU 
that it forces other countries – and in particular existing EU members – to respond more 
fiercely to their tax cuts. Using the weighted average of the 2004 values for new 
accession countries’ taxes (that is, those after the reduction blasted by Sarkozy) and 
simulating a switch of these countries from an EU to a non-EU status implies that the tax 
rates of EU countries would rise by 1.85%, an increase of 1.02 percentage points. This 
gives a rough idea of the importance of EU membership for the strategic interdependence 
of taxes. 15 
 
3.2 Robustness Checks 
Table 4 reassesses these results with respect to three aspects of our data: that it 
includes countries from around the globe, that it is an unbalanced panel, and that EU 
membership has only grown. Column 1 repeats the preferred fixed effects specification of 
Table 3 column 4 but utilizes only European countries.
19 Since EU countries are in 
Europe, it may be that the difference in response rates arises due to the fact that EU 
members are more geographically concentrated. Thus, the results may be driven by the 
different locations of the two groups rather than impacts on trade engendered by their EU 
status. As the estimates indicate, however, this is not the case as our results are very 
similar to those in Table 3. To deal with the unbalanced panel, column 2 repeats the 
preferred specification but restricts the time series to 1995-2005, a restriction that creates 
balance within our panel. Here, we again find results qualitatively the same as those 
above with the exception that the EUl,t * non-EU Spatial Lagl,t, interaction is now 
insignificant, potentially the result of our sample size being cut in half. Thus, our 
evidence for that countries respond to EU taxes is robust to these subsamples of the data. 
Column 3 addresses a different time series aspect of our data, namely that EU 
membership has grown over time. Thus, one might be concerned that the differences 
found between EU and non-EU countries may result from changes in the composition of 
membership over time rather than the increased sensitivity to one another’s taxes 
membership in the EU might create. To address this, in column 3 rather than defining our 
spatial lags and interactions according to EU membership, we define them according to 
whether or not a country is an EU15 nation. As this does not change over time, countries 
do not change categories and these difference are not driven by changes in membership. 
                                                 
19 The countries that fall into this group are listed in Table 1.  16 
 
Here we find largely comparable results, although we find no significant response to 
EU15 countries’ taxes. Since we are using country fixed effects and EU15 status does not 
change over time, this insignificance when relying exclusively on time series variation is 
not particularly surprising. In unreported results without fixed effects, we found a 
positive, significant coefficient for this variable. Thus, the use of EU15 status alleviates 
concerns that our results are driven solely by increasing EU membership.
20 
Table 5 considers four additional robustness checks. First, in column (1), rather 
than using a time trend we include year dummies. This is not our preferred method 
because using year dummies compares countries’ taxes to the mean within a year. Since 
the EU spatial lag does not vary across EU countries and the non-EU one does not vary 
across EU countries, inclusion of year dummies eliminates much of the variation within a 
given year. Klemm and van Parys (2009) provide for a detailed discussion of this issue in 
the context of spatial estimation of tax competition. Nevertheless, when doing so, we find 
comparable results for the non-EU spatial lag and interaction, although the magnitude of 
the non-interacted lag increases. Turning to the EU spatial lags, we find a similar sign 
pattern however we do not find significance for EU Spatial Lagl,t.  
In column (2) we use first differences in all of our variables excepting the EU 
dummy.
21 We do this for three reasons. First, there is a degree of persistence in the tax 
rates over time within a country. Second, issues of tax competition are often phrased as 
                                                 
20 In unreported results, we utilized a Eurozone dummy that was equal to one when a country had the Euro 
and zero otherwise. We found little evidence that indicated a difference in the reaction to Eurozone taxes as 
compared to non-Eurozone. While this suggests little impact of Euro membership on tax competition (or 
that these stable countries differ little from similar non-Euro ones), the short time frame of the data after the 
creation of the Euro likely limits our ability to obtain significant results. Therefore, this may be a fruitful 
area of research after additional time series data become available.  
21 When we also used a first difference for the EU dummy, we found comparable results. Note that the 
interpretation to this unreported regression would be that the differences in the spatial lags occur only in the 
year a country joins the EU. 17 
 
one in which a change in one country’s tax is driven by the change in another, that is 
changes are correlated not necessarily levels. Third, it allows us to compare our results to 
those of Altshuler and Goodspeed (2007) who use tax rate changes. When doing so, we 
find sign patterns similar to those above, however, we only find significance for the non-
interacted spatial lags. As before, the estimated coefficient on the EU spatial lag is larger 
than that one for non-EU taxes. This suggests that all nations (EU and non- EU countries) 
respond more to changes in EU taxes. 






















  (7) 
i.e. the market potential of country j which is itself discounted by the inverse distance 
between j and l. Since FDI is generally found to decline in the distance between the 
parent and host countries, one might expect that firms initially located in l might be 
willing to relocate to a country with a higher market potential with a particular preference 
for such countries that are near to their initial location. Thus, l would need to be 
cognizant of both neighbors with somewhat smaller market potentials as well as distant 
countries with large market potentials. Nevertheless, as shown in column (3), this 
alternative approach yielded results very similar to those using non-distance weighted 
market potentials.  
Finally, column (4) repeats the preferred specification but uses the statutory tax 
rate rather than the effective average tax rate. Here, we find a similar story as above: 
positive spatial lags across groups with EU members responding more to EU member 
taxes than non-member taxes. Thus, as in Devereux, Lockwood, and Redoano (2008) and 18 
 
Overesche and Rinke (2008), we find competition in both effective and statutory tax 
rates. 
3.3 Domestic market versus exports 
Finally, Table 6 attempts to provide some insight into the relative importance of 
the two components driving market potential – the domestic market and total exports. To 
do so, we create one weight using the domestic market (GDP minus exports plus imports, 
instrumented in the fashion described above for market potential) and one weight using 
exports (again constructed as above). In column (1), we utilize the domestic market 
scheme, finding results comparable in sign and significance to those using market 
potential. Column (2) uses the export scheme. Here, although we find similar signs to the 
market potential weighting scheme, the only significant spatial lag is for the interaction 
indicating that EU countries respond less to non-EU countries. Finally, column (3) uses 
both. Given the high degree of correlation between the export weighted lag and the 
domestic market weighted lag, it is not surprising that we find little of significance.
22 
Nevertheless, the pattern of coefficients continues for the domestic market lags. Taken as 
a whole, these estimates suggest that of the two, domestic market size might hold more 
sway than exports in tax competition. This result might be anticipated if FDI is more 
geared towards domestic sales than exporting, a result found by Markusen and Maskus 




                                                 
22 This correlation is also manifested in the domestic market and export control variable with only the 
domestic market is significant. 19 
 
4. Conclusion 
  The goal of this paper has been to investigate whether any evidence can be found 
to support the notion that expansion of the European Union has exacerbated tax 
competition. To do so, as motivated by Baldwin and Krugman (2004) we utilize market 
potential, that is the size of the domestic market combined with access to foreign markets, 
as the weighting scheme. Utilizing this weight, we find robust evidence of tax 
competition. In particular, we find that while both EU members and non-EU members 
respond more to member taxes with this difference even greater for EU members. This 
then lends credence to the concerns expressed in policy circles that expansion of the EU 
may lead to more aggressive tax competition.  
  Note that these findings say nothing about whether such tax competition is 
inherently bad. While there exist many models in which tax competition results in 
inefficient equilibria (either because it implies underprovision of public goods or because 
it distorts investment locations), there also exist models in which tax competition is 
beneficial. Therefore our results should be interpreted as providing evidence on the 
existence and extent of the phenomenon, not its welfare implications. Nevertheless, we 
hope that they provide a useful context for further research and enhanced policy making. 20 
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Table 1: Countries in the Sample 
 










Australia  1982  -  Korea  1996  - 
Austria
*†  1982  1995  Latvia
*  1996  2004 
Belgium
*†  1982  1957  Lithuania
*  1996  2004 
Bulgaria
*  1994  2007  Luxembourg
*†  1991  1957 
Canada  1980  -  Malta
*  1989  2004 
China  1991  -  Mexico  1995  - 
Cyprus
*  1994  2004  Netherlands




1991  2004  New Zealand  1991  - 
Denmark
*†  1986  1973  Norway
*  1982  - 
Estonia
*  1994  2004  Poland
*  1992  2004 
Finland
*†  1982  1995  Portugal
*†  1982  1986 
France
*†  1980  1957  Slovak 
Republic
* 
1991  2004 
Germany
*†  1980  1957  Slovenia
*  1995  2004 
Greece
*†  1980  1981  Spain
*†  1980  1986 
Hungary
*  1991  2004  Sweden
*†  1982  1995 
Iceland  1992  -  Switzerland
*  1982  - 
Ireland
*†  1980  1973  UK
*†  1980  1973 
Italy
*†  1980  1957  United States  1980  - 
Japan  1980  -       
 
* denotes European country. 
† denotes EU15 country. 
 
 
Table 2: Summary Statistics 
 
 
Variable  Obs.  Mean  Std. Dev.  Minimum  Maximum 
Effective Average 
Tax Ratel,t 
680  -1.254246  .3674647  -2.615606  -.6329393 
Statutory Tax Ratel,t  680  -1.085281  .3581699  -2.302585  -.4827252 
Market Potentiall,t  680  12.21358  2.029293  8.243695  19.12246 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1  680  2.914555  .2331098  2.265194  3.399302 
Urbanl,t  680  4.252471  .1920743  3.339322  4.577799 
Dependencyl,t  680  -.7028915  .08965  -.9404324  -.3581957 
EUl,t  680  .4470588  .4975553  0  1 
Opennessl,t  680  -3.083244  4.421151  -11.63395  9.444099 
 24 
 
Table 3: Baseline Results 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
         
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t    0.547***  0.783***  0.257** 
    (0.176)  (0.146)  (0.112) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t      -0.455***  -0.158* 
      (0.134)  (0.087) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t    1.342***  1.196***  0.678** 
    (0.454)  (0.413)  (0.307) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t      0.479  -0.163 
      (0.355)  (0.252) 
Market Potentiall,t  0.087***  0.087***  0.093***  1.818*** 
  (0.015)  (0.013)  (0.013)  (0.326) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1  0.298***  0.313***  0.304***  -0.110 
  (0.060)  (0.055)  (0.059)  (0.084) 
Urbanl,t  0.520***  0.630***  0.655***  0.412** 
  (0.091)  (0.080)  (0.077)  (0.203) 
Dependencyl,t  -1.140***  -1.216***  -1.235***  -0.753*** 
  (0.246)  (0.213)  (0.200)  (0.158) 
EUl,t  -0.076***  -0.084***  0.046  -0.636*** 
  (0.027)  (0.023)  (0.324)  (0.237) 
Opennessl,t  0.010*  0.008  0.010*  0.227 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  (0.005)  (0.159) 
Trendt  -0.027***  0.036*  0.038**  -0.070*** 
  (0.002)  (0.019)  (0.015)  (0.015) 
Constant  -5.730***  -5.068***  -5.205***  -22.468*** 
  (0.697)  (0.556)  (0.683)  (3.289) 
         
Observations  680  680  680  680 
R-squared  0.403  0.413  0.440  0.869 
         
Fixed Effects  No  No  No  Yes 
 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses.25 
 
Table 4: Alternative Samples 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 






       
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t  0.481***  0.786*  0.329*** 
  (0.178)  (0.473)  (0.110) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t  -0.230*  -0.074  -0.176** 
  (0.126)  (0.115)  (0.070) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t  0.796**  1.290*  0.323 
  (0.376)  (0.684)  (0.214) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t  0.063  -0.281  0.042 
  (0.325)  (0.199)  (0.206) 
Market Potentiall,t  3.432***  2.274***  1.796*** 
  (0.805)  (0.757)  (0.319) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1  -0.093  -0.598***  -0.207* 
  (0.127)  (0.166)  (0.121) 
Urbanl,t  0.188  0.563  0.384* 
  (0.299)  (0.448)  (0.219) 
Dependencyl,t  -0.977***  0.261  -0.797*** 
  (0.162)  (0.319)  (0.141) 
EUl,t  -0.559**  -0.755***  -0.314*** 
  (0.282)  (0.217)  (0.040) 
Opennessl,t  0.229  0.318  0.311* 
  (0.273)  (0.237)  (0.173) 
Trendt  -0.108***  -0.050  -0.073*** 
  (0.033)  (0.050)  (0.016) 
Constant  -38.940***  -24.943***  -21.922*** 
  (8.530)  (7.221)  (3.366) 
       
Observations  516  395  680 
R-squared  0.878  0.877  0.866 
       
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 26 
 
 
Table 5: Additional Robustness Checks 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 









Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t  2.327***  0.355**  0.202*  0.219* 
  (0.620)  (0.141)  (0.109)  (0.120) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial 
Lagl,t 
-0.125**  0.018  -0.154*  -0.217** 
  (0.062)  (0.113)  (0.081)  (0.087) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t  1.914  0.649***  0.589**  0.388* 
  (1.223)  (0.226)  (0.288)  (0.232) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t  -0.357**  0.026  -0.168  -0.052 
  (0.172)  (0.106)  (0.231)  (0.197) 
Market Potentiall,t  1.738***  0.172  1.796***  1.641*** 
  (0.278)  (0.236)  (0.303)  (0.318) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1  -0.144  0.236**  -0.118  0.004 
  (0.106)  (0.093)  (0.118)  (0.097) 
Urbanl,t  0.787***  1.287  0.396**  0.588*** 
  (0.232)  (0.964)  (0.186)  (0.213) 
Dependencyl,t  -0.906***  -0.730*  -0.754***  -0.627*** 
  (0.173)  (0.391)  (0.128)  (0.166) 
EUl,t  -0.818***  0.032  -0.637***  -0.511*** 
  (0.169)  (0.020)  (0.220)  (0.146) 
Opennessl,t  0.195  0.087  0.219  0.039 
  (0.130)  (0.103)  (0.182)  (0.171) 
Trendt    -0.000  -0.074***  -0.068*** 
    (0.001)  (0.014)  (0.017) 
Constant  -
21.657*** 
-0.015  -22.2***  -
22.220*** 
  (3.567)  (0.012)  (3.246)  (3.177) 
         
Observations  680  660  680  680 
R-squared  0.875  0.539  0.869  0.880 
         
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 
All variables in column (2) are in first differences excepting the EU dummies and the 
constant.  27 
 
Table 6: Domestic Market versus Exports 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3) 
VARIABLES  Domestic Market Only  Exports Only  Both 
Domestic Market Weights 
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t  0.343***    0.607 
  (0.127)    (0.383) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t  -0.199**    -0.242 
  (0.081)    (0.551) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t  0.679**    1.540* 
  (0.286)    (0.814) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t  -0.064    0.575 
  (0.211)    (0.898) 
Export Weights 
Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t    0.175  -0.311 
    (0.175)  (0.528) 
EUl,t *Non-EU Spatial Lagl,t    -0.173***  0.015 
    (0.063)  (0.602) 
EU Spatial Lagl,t    0.433  -0.970 
    (0.303)  (0.851) 
EUl,t *EU Spatial Lagl,t    -0.202  -0.679 
    (0.184)  (0.924) 
Domestic Market,t  1.461***  1.185***  1.486*** 
  (0.265)  (0.309)  (0.337) 
Exports,t  -0.273  0.023  -0.279 
  (0.324)  (0.350)  (0.398) 
Gov. Expendituresl,t-1  -0.122  -0.135  -0.113 
  (0.110)  (0.101)  (0.111) 
Urbanl,t  0.474**  0.417*  0.436* 
  (0.215)  (0.216)  (0.244) 
Dependencyl,t  -0.743***  -0.752***  -0.631*** 
  (0.168)  (0.111)  (0.199) 
EUl,t  -0.480**  -0.637***  -0.575* 
  (0.190)  (0.187)  (0.296) 
Opennessl,t  0.570  0.222  0.608 
  (0.368)  (0.410)  (0.443) 
Trendt  -0.035**  -0.05***  -0.037* 
  (0.014)  (0.015)  (0.020) 
Constant  -16.42***  -15.4***  -16.6*** 
  (2.028)  (2.216)  (2.465) 
       
Observations  680  680  680 
R-squared  0.870  0.868  0.871 
       
Fixed Effects  Yes  Yes  Yes 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Robust, bootstrapped standard errors in parentheses. 28 
 
 










A.1 A Simple Model of Tax Competition 
  In this appendix, we present a very simple, stylized model of tax competition for 
exporting firms akin to that of Baldwin and Krugman (2004). As the goal of this model is 
to motivate the use of market potential as a weighting scheme in as clear a fashion as 
possible, our model lacks many of the complicating features of more advanced models. 
This parsimony allows us to derive in a straightforward manner a set of results on the 
relative slopes of best response functions. We refer the reader to Baldwin and Krugman 
(2004) as well as the literature summarized by Fuest, Huber, and Mintz (2005) for more 
detailed theoretic treatments. 
  Consider a setting in which there are a large number of firms and three countries. 
The  N  firms are indexed by i and the countries are indexed by l where  { } 1,2,3 l∈ .  
Each firm i produces a good in a single country but sells that good in each of the three 
countries by exporting.
23 The inverse demand curve in country l is: 
  ( ) ( )
2
l l l p i A q i
α
= −   (8) 
where  ( ) l q i  is the amount firm i sells in country l.
24 Production is constant returns to 
scale in each country l where the local per-unit production cost is  l w . When producing 
in country l and exporting to country  j , the firm incurs a per-unit trade cost of  , l j c  
where  , 0 l l c = . These components result in the firm’s taxable profits which, when firm i 





( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) j j l j l j j
j j j
p i q i w q i c q i
= = =
− − ∑ ∑ ∑ .  (9) 
Investment in a country carries some risk, where with probability 1 l ψ − , the profits in (9) 
fall to zero. This can be thought of as, among other things, the risk of expropriation 
(where we utilize the broad notion of expropriation which includes changes in 
government policy that reduce the value of investment– for example a rise in 
protectionism resulting in retaliation from other countries, changes in industrial or 
environmental regulation, and the like).
25 The firm pays tax rate  l t  on its expected taxable 
                                                 
23 Thus, we are not admitting the possibility of horizontal multinationals of the Markusen (1984) type that 
produce in multiple countries to serve local markets while avoiding trade costs. Alternatively, one could 
assume that fixed plant-level costs are so high that only one plant per firm arises in equilibrium. 
24 Note that for simplicity, we assume that there are no product or factor market interactions among firms. 
25 The broad definition of expropriation is used in agreements such as NAFTA (see Aisbett, et. al (2006) for 
discussion). It is notable that whereas in 2009 US responses to the global recession included controversial 
“buy American” provisions that discriminated against foreign firms, no such attempts were made within the 
EU. Although many EU governments introduced ``cash for clunkers’’ programs to stimulate sales by car 
manufacturers these did not discriminate in favour of national producers as that would violate EU internal 
market rules. This illustrates how EU membership can provide a policy anchor not found in other trade 
agreements that reduces expropriation.  30 
 
profits.
26 In addition, when located in country l, firm i receives an additional amount of 
untaxable income  ( ) l i σ . One interpretation of this would be idiosyncratic fixed costs 
(possibly including relocation costs).  This term is identically and independently 
distributed across firms and locations according to a log Weibull distribution with mean 
zero. Thus, when firm i locates in country l, its total expected after-tax profits are: 




( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) l l l j j l j l j j l
j j j
i t p i q i w q i c q i i π ψ σ
= = =
 
= − − − +  
  ∑ ∑ ∑ .  (10) 
In equilibrium, the expected profits of firm i in location l are: 
  ( ) ( ) ( )
3 2 1 1
,
1
( ) 1 2 ( ) 1 ( ) l l l j l l j l l l l
j
i t A w c i t i π ψ α σ σ
− −
=
= − − − + = − Π + ∑   (11) 
where expected market potential is  ( )
3 2 1 1
,
1
2 l l j l l j
j
A w c ψ α
− −
=
Π = − − ∑ .  Each firm locates 
in the region offering it the greatest expected equilibrium profits. Similar to the derivation 
of the Logit estimator (see Greene, 2007), the probability that firm i locates in country l 
(denoted  l P ) is: 
  ( ) ( )
3
1




  = − Π − Π       ∑ .  (12) 
Note that: 














= Π >   (13) 
i.e. as a country’s tax rises, the probability of hosting a given firm falls whereas a rise in 
another nation’s tax increases l’s chance at hosting a given firm. 
Aggregating across the large number of firms implies that (at least in expected 
value) the equilibrium number of firms that location l hosts is  l P  and that its tax 
revenues are: 
  l l l t PNΠ .  (14) 
  Governments simultaneously choose tax rates in order to maximize their own tax 
revenues. For country l, this yields an optimal value of its tax: 
  ( )
1 1 1 l l l t P
− − = − Π   (15) 
where  l P  depends on all three tax rates. From this, we can calculate the slope of the best 












  (16) 
i.e. taxes are strategic complements.
27 Comparing this between countries  j  and k  for 
country l: 
                                                 
26 Note that the firm only pays taxes in the country where it is headquartered. This is in keeping with 
international tax law where countries do not tax profits earned within their borders unless they are done so 
through a permanent establishment which, in our model, only exists in the firm’s chosen country. 
27 Competition for FDI is not the only model that can yield strategic complementarity. One alternative is the 
yardstick competition model wherein residents of one location compare the taxes set in their region with 31 
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    − Π Π Π     = =
  Π − Π Π      
.  (17) 
This corresponds to a greater sensitivity to the tax rate in countries that have greater 
market potentials. The intuition here is straightforward. If country j is an attractive 
location relative to k (in expected value terms), this is because pre-tax profits generated 
by a firm located there are large compared to those that could be generated in k. This then 
means that a drop in j’s tax rate creates a bigger increase in profits than does a 
comparable fall in k’s tax. In turn, this increases the sensitivity of firm location to j’s tax 
than k’s, implying that l must be more cognizant of j’s tax when setting its own.  
  Several items feed into the relative profitability of a given country represented by 
the dependency of the tax base on the four factors that vary by location. First, countries 
with bigger local demands – i.e. a high  l A  – are more profitable locations. This is because 
firms in this location can serve the local market without suffering trade costs. Second, a 
location with low wage costs ( l w ) is advantageous for obvious reasons. Third, a location 
with easy access to other locations, represented by low  , l j c s, are more profitable because 
of its suitability as an export platform. This is akin to the growing interest in “third 
market” effects in the FDI literature where research has expanded the notion of market 
size to include not only the host country itself but also markets that can be accessed from 
a particular host.
28 Finally, that is is less risky will, all else equal, be the more preferred 
location. These latter two terms are one of interest for us since the expansion of the EU 
would increase the sensitivity of other countries to the new members’ taxes. This occurs 
for two reasons. First, a country lowers its trade costs by joining a free trade area such as 
the EU, raising its market potential. Second, a country that joins the EU may lower its 
perceived risk of expropriation. This might occur if EU membership acts as a “policy 
anchor”, that is, a commitment or signal that a country is unlikely to unilaterally change 
its policies in a way detrimental to investment. Thus, joining to the EU this would 
increase a country’s attractiveness to firms and its importance to other nations’ taxes.
29  
  As a last point, our model relies on expected market potential, i.e. a measure that 
accurately accounts for expropriation risk. If  l ψ  is the same for all countries, then when 











Φ ∑ ) is sufficient when constructing weights. Alternatively, 
suppose that it differs between two groups that are differentiated according to EU 
                                                                                                                                            
those elsewhere as a method of judging the extent of local corruption and models of imperfect information 
where government officials may glean information from the taxes set elsewhere, leading them to revise 
their taxes when they see those in other countries change.  
28 Theory work in this area includes Ekholm, Forslid, and Markusen (2007) while empirical work includes 
Head and Mayer (2004), Blonigen, Davies, Waddell, Naughton (2007), and Baltagi, Egger, and 
Pfaffermayer (2007). 
29 The literature on policy anchors dates back to Kydland and Prescott (1977). Recent examples discussing 
trade agreements as policy anchors include Francois (1997), Galal and Hoekman (1997), and Tovias and 
Ugar (2004), with the latter two specifically discussing the EU as a policy anchor. Lane (2008) discusses 
EU membership as a policy anchor that enhanced financial flows in the new accession countries. 32 
 
membership (as when membership acts as a policy anchor). In this case, separating the 
countries into two groups and row standardizing within groups again permits the use of 
observed market potential.
30 This provides an additional rationale for using multiple 
spatial lags beyond those discussed in the main text. 
 
A.2 Construction of the EATR 
The EATR described by Devereux and Griffith (1998, 2003) measures the proportion of 
total income taken in tax from a hypothetical investment project (requiring one unit of 
capital for one period). More specifically, it is defined as the difference between the 
project’s net present value in the absence and presence of tax, scaled by the net present 
value of the pre-tax total income stream, net of depreciation: 
  ( ) ( )
* (1 ) EATR R R r ρ = − +  
The variable  ρ  represents the project’s real financial return, is the real interest rate, 
* R is the project’s net present value in the absence of tax, i.e.  ( ) ( )
* 1 R r r ρ = − + . 
Abstracting from personal income taxes, the project’s net present value in the presence of 
corporate tax is: 
  ( )( ) ( ) ( ) 1 1 1
1
R r r F
i
τφ
ρ δ τ δ
    = + − + − − + +     +    
 
The variable δ  denotes the depreciation rate, τ is the statutory corporate income tax rate, 
 is the nominal interest rate, and φ  is the rate at which capital expenditure can be offset 
against tax which is conditional on the type of capital employed. The variable F  
represents additional costs or benefits due to the source of financing. If the project is 
completely financed by retained earnings or new equity, 0 F = . Note that new equity is 
an equivalent source of finance to retained earnings when abstracting from shareholder 
taxation and informational asymmetries. If the project is completely financed by debt, 
(1 )/(1 ) F i i τ τφ = − + , which is positive due to the deductibility of interest payments. For 
calculating EATRs , we adopt following assumptions about parameter values from an EU 
Commission Report (Devereux, et al., 2008): the project’s real financial return ρ  is 0.2, 
the real interest rate   is 0.05, and the nominal interest rate i is 0.071. Retained earnings 
and new equity represent 65 percent and debt 35 percent of the source of financing. 
Furthermore, we assume that the investment consists of machinery for 50 percent, of 
buildings for 28 percent, and of inventory for 22 percent. The depreciation rate δ  is 
assumed to be 0.1225 for machinery, 0.0361 for buildings and 0 for inventory. The 
information about countries’ tax parameters  and φ is taken from Loretz’s (2008) data. 
The statutory tax rate τ  is the top marginal tax on corporate income including 
representative local taxes. For each type of capital expenditure, the most favorable 





                                                 
30 Note that relative weights between countries within the same group do not change because the increase in 
weights is proportional. 33 
 
A.3 Predicting Market Potential 
Populationl,t  0.835*** 
  (0.222) 
Populationl,t
2  0.068* 
  (0.039) 
EUl,t  0.093*** 
  (0.025) 
Trendt  0.029*** 
  (0.001) 
Constant  8.889*** 
  (0.377) 
   
Observations  885 
R-squared  0.719 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Includes country specific fixed effects. 
 
A.4 Predicting Exports 
  Our Method 
   
Exporter Populationl,t  -2.759*** 
  (0.209) 
Exporter Populationl,t
2  0.269*** 
  (0.025) 
Importer Populationj,t  -0.933*** 
  (0.185) 
Importer Populationj,t
2  0.184*** 
  (0.023) 
RTAl,j,t  0.265*** 
  (0.017) 
Trendt  0.070*** 
  (0.001) 
Constant  9.016*** 
  (0.515) 
Observations  25942 
R-squared  0.259 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Includes directional, pair-specific fixed effects. 